NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2002, Volume 17 by J. Bradford DeLong
This PDF is a selection from a published volume
from the National Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2002,
Volume 17
Volume Author/Editor: Mark Gertler and Kenneth
Rogoff, editors
Volume Publisher: MIT Press
Volume ISBN: 0-262-07246-7
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/gert03-1
Conference Date: April 5-6, 2002
Publication Date: January 2003
Title: Productivity Growth in the 2000s
Author: J. Bradford DeLong
URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11074J. Bradford  DeLong 
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY  AND  NBER 
Productivity  Growth  in  the  2000s 
1. Introduction 
In the early 1970s, U.S. productivity  growth fell off a cliff. Measured out- 
put per person-hour  had  averaged  a growth  rate of 2.8% per year from 
1947 to 1973. It averaged  a growth  rate of only  1.3% per year from 1973 
to  1995. In the second  half of the  1990s American  productivity  growth 
resumed  its pre-1973 pace.  Between  1995 and the third quarter of 2002, 
U.S.  measured  nonfarm-business  output  per  person-hour  worked  ap- 
peared  to grow  at an annual rate of 2.8% per year. 
Nearly  all observers  agree on the causes  of the productivity  speedup 
of 1995-2002.  It is the result of the extraordinary wave  of technological 
innovation  in  computer  and  communications  equipment.  Assume  that 
this near-consensus  is correct: that the productivity  growth  speedup  in 
the second half of the 1990s was the result of the technological revolutions 
in data processing  and data communications.  What, then, will the future 
hold?  Will the decade  of the 2000s see  labor productivity  growth  more 
like the fast growth  seen in the late 1990s? Or more like the slow  growth 
of the 1980s? 
In my view,  the way to bet is that the next ten years or so will see labor 
productivity  growth  as fast as or faster than the U.S. economy  has seen 
since 1995. The answer to the question, "What can we expect from produc- 
tivity growth in America over the next 10 to 20 years?" is "We can expect 
very  good  things." 
The case for this point of view  follows  almost immediately  from simple 
growth  accounting  and growth theory. The main argument of this paper 
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begins, after a brief review of the recent history and recent assessments  of 
the cases of changes in productivity  growth, by considering  the simplest 
possible  growth-theory  model  that has  traction on  the major issues.  In 
the near-consensus  analysis,  increased  total factor productivity  (TFP) in 
the information technology  (IT) capital-goods-producing  sector, coupled 
with  extraordinary real capital deepening  as the quantity of real invest- 
ment in IT capital bought by a dollar of nominal savings grows, has driven 
the productivity  growth acceleration of the later 1990s. The extraordinary 
pace of invention  and innovation  in the IT sector has generated real price 
declines of between  10% and 20% per year in information processing  and 
communications  equipment  for nearly forty years so far. These extraordi- 
nary cost  declines  have  made  a unit of real investment  in computer  or 
communications  equipment absurdly cheap, and hence made the quantity 
of real investment and thus capital deepening  in IT capital absurdly large.1 
In the 1990s the expanding  role and influence  of these leading  sectors 
became macroeconomically  significant. In a standard growth-accounting 
framework, the later 1990s saw rapid labor productivity  growth because 
of  (1) rapid  technological  progress  in the leading  sectors,  (2) a healthy 
share of expenditure  on the products of these leading  sectors, raising the 
real IT capital-output  ratio, and (3) continued  utility of IT capital in pro- 
duction.  Continued  declines  in the prices of IT capital mean that a con- 
stant nominal flow of savings channeled to such investments  brings more 
and more real investment.  The social return to IT investment  would  have 
to suddenly  drop to nearly zero, the share of nominal investment  spend- 
ing devoted  to IT capital would  have  to collapse,  or technological  prog- 
ress in IT would  have to slow  drastically, for labor productivity  growth 
in the next  decade  to reverse itself and return to its late 1970s or 1980s 
levels.  Yet there are no technological  reasons for the pace of productivity 
increase in our economy's  leading sectors to decline over the next decade 
or so. Thus if nominal  shares of expenditure  on IT capital and of income 
attributable to existing IT capital remain constant, we can expect the next 
decade  or more  to be  like  the  past  since  1995. That is  the  lesson  that 
growth-theory  finger exercises have  to teach us. 
Second,  there  are four  unknown  cards  in  the  hole-four  reasons  to 
think that the future is likely to be brighter than the simplest models  sug- 
gest. First, the elasticity of demand  for IT goods  is likely to remain high. 
A high elasticity of demand  for IT technology  goods  means that as prices 
fall, expenditure  shares will  not remain constant but will  rise, boosting 
1. It may indeed  be the case that a unit of real investment  in computer or communications 
equipment  "earned the same rate of return" as any other unit of real investment,  as Robert 
Gordon (2002) puts it. But the extraordinary cheapness  of the real unit of capital contrib- 
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growth.  Second, the long-time  trend shows  the share of national income 
attributable to the returns on the existing  IT capital stock rising as well. 
It would  be  surprising  if this forty-year trend suddenly  stopped  today. 
A rising share of national income attributable to existing IT capital would 
boost  growth  as well. 
Third, Basu, Fernald, and  Shapiro (2002) take adjustment  costs  in in- 
vestment  seriously,  and conclude  that late-1990s growth undershot  trend 
growth by about 0.5 percentage points per year. Fourth, Paul David (1991) 
has argued for decades that general-purpose  technologies  boost labor pro- 
ductivity in two stages: (1) first, capital deepening;  (2) second, social learn- 
ing about how  to use new  technologies  efficiently,  a process  that drives 
rapid TFP growth  for an extensive  period  of time but that cannot begin 
until  diffusion  is nearly complete.  If the pattern he believes  holds  turns 
out  to hold  for IT we  can expect  to  see  rapid  TFP growth  in  IT-using 
industries  emerge  at  some  point  as  an  additional  growth-promoting 
factor. 
Now  it is not likely that all of these hole cards will turn out to be valu- 
able face cards. But it is highly unlikely that none of them will be winners. 
Thus standard growth-accounting  analyses predict a future like the recent 
past  to be a lower  bound  to reasonable  forecasts of future productivity 
growth. 
Is there any reason to be pessimistic? I can think of only one possible hole 
card on the pessimistic  side-a  fear of large-scale  governmental  failure 
in  setting  forth the institutional  framework  to support  information-age 
markets. If governments  fail to properly structure the micro marketplace 
to  encourage  the  growth  of  high-productivity  IT-based industries  and 
practices, then and only then will optimistic macro conclusions be cast into 
doubt. 
2.  The  Pattern  of Growth  in the Later  1990s 
2.1 ASSESSMENTS  OF THE  RECENT  PRODUCTIVITY 
GROWTH  SPEEDUP 
In the early 1970s, U.S. productivity  growth fell off a cliff. Measured out- 
put per person-hour worked in nonfarm business  had averaged a growth 
rate of 2.84% per year from  1947 to  1973. It averaged  a growth  rate of 
only 1.34%  per year from 1973 to 1995.2  The productivity  slowdown  meant 
2. The deceleration  in the growth rate of total real GDP was somewhat smaller:  the social 
changes  that  brought  more women into the paid labor  force  in enormous  numbers  cush- 
ioned the effect of this productivity  slowdown on the growth rate  of measured  total real 
GDP, if not its effect on Americans'  material  welfare. 116 * DELONG 
that,  according  to  official  statistics,  Americans  in  1995  were  only  70% as 
productive  as  their  predecessors  back  in  the  early  1970s  would  have  ex- 
pected  them  to  be.  The  productivity  slowdown  gave  rise  to  an  age  of 
diminished  expectations  that  had  powerful  although  still  debated  effects 
on  American  politics  and  society.3 
In the  second  half  of the  1990s  American  productivity  stood  up,  picked 
up  its  mat,  and  walked.  It resumed  its  pre-1973  pace.  Between  1995  and 
the  third  quarter  of  2002,  U.S.  measured  nonfarm-business  output  per 
person-hour  worked  appeared  to  grow  at  an  annual  rate  of  2.79%  per 
year.4 
Noneconomists  tended  to  attribute  a  large  chunk  of  fast  late-1990s 
growth  to  "cyclical"  factors.5  Economists,  however,  have  had  a  much 
harder  time  attributing  more  than  a few  tenths  of a percentage  point  per 
year  of  late-1990s  growth  to  the  business  cycle.6  The  standard  indicators 
of high  cyclically-driven  productivity  were  absent.  Moreover,  as Susanto 
Basu,  John Femald,  and  Matthew  Shapiro  have  argued,  there  are stronger 
reasons  for thinking  that  the  adjustment  costs  associated  with  moving  to 
a more  IT-capital-intensive  growth  path  led  actual  growth  to  understate 
trend  growth  than  for  thinking  that  cyclical  factors  led  actual  growth  to 
overstate  trend  growth  in the second  half  of the  1990s.7  And  the extremely 
rapid  runup  of  stock  prices  indicated  that  at least  the  marginal  investor 
3. See Krugman  (1994) for one interpretation  of how  the productivity  slowdown  made  a 
significant  difference. 
4. Figuring out what the growth rate of real output has been since 1994 poses unusual chal- 
lenges.  The most  important  of these  is  the discrepancy  between  national  product  and 
national  income.  In 1994 the statistical discrepancy  between  the two-the  amount  you 
had  to  add  to national  product  in order to  get  to national  income  after making  all of 
the conceptual  and definitional  adjustments-was  +$59  billion.  By 2000 this statistical 
discrepancy  was  -$130  billion.  National  income  grew  by  an extra $190 billion  relative 
to national  product  between  1994 and  2000, not  because  of conceptual  definitions  but 
because  of errors and omissions  (or, rather, inconsistent  and changing patterns of errors 
and omissions).  By now  this shift in the statistical discrepancy  adds  up  to an amount 
equal to 3.5% of national product. Take national product as your guide  to the growth of 
the American economy,  and you conclude  that measured  real labor productivity  growth 
from 1995 to 2002 was 2.63% per year. Take national income as your guide  and you con- 
clude  that it was  2.95% per year.  Split  the  difference-as  Martin Baily  (2002) recom- 
mends-and  you  conclude  that it was  2.77% per year. I am agnostic  as to which  of the 
two  measures  of the economy's  size  is going  awry,  and so I follow  Baily and split  the 
difference. Note that this divergence between  product- and income-side  measures of eco- 
nomic  output  is very  recent. Between  1959 and  1973, product  grew  faster than income 
by an average of only 0.04% per year. Between  1973 and 1995, income  grew  faster than 
product  by  an average  of 0.02% per year. The sustained  growth  discrepancy  between 
1995 and 2002 of 0.35% per year is extremely  unusual. 
5. See, for example,  Kosterlitz (2002). 
6. See Gordon (2002) and Gordon (2000a, 2000b). 
7. See Basu, Femald,  and Shapiro (2001). Productivity Growth in the 2000s * 117 
in  equities  anticipated  that  the  acceleration  of  economic  growth  that 
started in the mid-1990s would  last for decades  or longer.8 
The causes  of the productivity  slowdown  of  1973-1995  or so  remain 
disappointingly  mysterious.  Baily (2002) calls the growth-accounting  lit- 
erature on the slowdown  "large but inconclusive."  No  single  factor pro- 
vides  a convincing  and coherent  explanation,  and the residual  position 
that a large number  of growth-retarding  factors suddenly  happened  to 
hit at once is but the least unlikely  of the residual  explanations.9 
By contrast, nearly all agree on the causes of the productivity  speedup 
of  1995-2001:  it is the result of the extraordinary wave  of technological 
innovation  in  computer  and  communications  equipment.  Even  though 
the failure of economists  to reach consensus  in their explanations  of the 
productivity  slowdown  has to leave one wary of the reliability of the con- 
sensus  about the causes of the productivity  speedup,  the depth and range 
of this near-consensus  is remarkable. 
Robert Gordon (2002) writes that cyclical factors account for "0.40" per- 
centage  points  of the growth  acceleration,  and  that the rest is fully  ac- 
counted  for by IT-an  "0.30 [percentage] point  acceleration  [from] MFP 
growth  in  computer  and  computer-related  semiconductor  manufactur- 
ing" and a "capital-deepening  effect of faster growth in computer capital 
...  [that] in the aggregate economy  accounts  [for] 0.60 percentage points 
of the acceleration." 
Kevin Stiroh (2001) writes that "all of the direct contribution to the post- 
1995 productivity  acceleration can be traced to the industries  that either 
produce  [IT capital goods]  or use  [them] most  intensively,  with  no  net 
contribution  from  other  industries  .  .  . relatively  isolated  from  the  [IT] 
revolution." 
Oliner and Sichel (2000) write that "the rapid capital deepening  related 
to  information  technology  capital  accounted  for nearly  half  of  this  in- 
crease" in labor productivity  growth, with a powerful  "additional growth 
contribution  ...  com[ing]  through efficiency improvement  in the produc- 
tion of  computing  equipment."  Jorgenson,  Ho,  and  Stiroh (2001) reach 
the same  conclusions  about the importance  of IT capital deepening  and 
increased efficiency in the production  of computing  and communications 
8. See Greenwood  and Jovanovic  (1999). 
9. See Fischer (1988), Griliches (1988), Jorgenson (1988), and Gordon (2000b, 2002). Jorgenson 
(1988) convincingly  demonstrates  that the oil price shocks can plausibly  account for slow 
growth  in potential  output  in the 1970s, but why  does  potential  output  growth  remain 
slow  after 1986 after real oil prices have fallen again? Griliches (1988) finds that an expla- 
nation  in terms of a slowdown  in innovation  is unattractive, but Gordon  (2000b, 2002) 
finds  such an explanation  attractive. 118 ?  DELONG 
equipment  as major drivers of the productivity  growth acceleration, and 
they  go on to forecast that labor productivity  growth  will  be as high  in 
the next decade  as it has been in the past half decade.10 
The only  major empirical  study  taking  a stand  against  this explana- 
tion is that of the McKinsey Global Institute (2001), which  presents  a re- 
gression  of the  growth  in value  added  per worker  and  the increase  in 
computer  capital by  industry.  When  industry  observations  are counted 
equally, it finds next to no correlation between  computer capital and labor 
productivity.  When  industries  are weighted  by  employment,  it finds  a 
statistically  significant  and substantively  important connection.  It is un- 
clear why  the McKinsey Global Institute prefers its unweighted  regres- 
sions  to its weighted  ones. 
In its case studies the McKinsey Global Institute attributes rapid growth 
in productivity  in the retail distribution sector to managerial innovations 
on the part of Wal-Mart, coupled  with  competitive  pressure  exerted by 
Wal-Mart on the rest of the sector. However,  Wal-Mart's founders  and 
executives  have long attributed much of their competitive  success  to the 
skillful  and intensive  use  of IT. For example,  Sam Walton  (1992) wrote 
in  his  autobiography  (quoted  in  Cohen,  DeLong,  and  Zysman,  2000) 
about how  "information sharing  [was] a new  source of power  ...  [W]e 
believed  in showing  a store manager every single number relating to his 
store, and eventually  we began  sharing those numbers with  the depart- 
ment heads in our stores....  That's why we've  spent hundreds of millions 
of  dollars  on  computers  and  satellites-to  spread  all  the  little  details 
around  the company  as fast as possible.  But they  were  worth  the cost. 
It's only because of information technology  that our store managers have 
a really clear sense  of what  they're doing  most of the time....  " 
One of the few prominent  economists  who  appear to expect slow  pro- 
ductivity  growth  over  the medium  turn is Joseph Stiglitz.  As Stiglitz is 
quoted by Kosterlitz (2002): "The fact that things have stabilized does not 
mean  they've  recovered.  When people  say things  are not so bleak, they 
mean that the economy  is not in free fall, not in a negative spiral." Koster- 
litz goes on to write, "The recovery, [Stiglitz] says, might not be as snappy 
as the conventional  models  used by the forecasters suggest.  'Most down- 
turns have been inventory recessions. They tend to be short-lived; as com- 
panies deplete their inventories,  things improve. This is different. It's not 
just an inventory downturn, but also a case of overcapacity in areas where 
there was lots of investing-IT,  telecom....  These represent a significant 
10. However,  Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh expect  total real GDP growth  to slow  because  of 
slower  growth in hours worked-they  forecast 1.1% per year growth  in hours over the 
next decade,  compared  to 2.3% per year from 1995 to 2000. Productivity  Growth  in the  2000s ? 119 
share of investment  in the late 1990s,' said Stiglitz. Things won't improve 
until industry  gets rid of excess equipment  and employees,  he says. 'The 
real restructuring takes time.'" 
Such  arguments  that  recessions  are  the  result  of  "overinvestment" 
which  must inevitably  lead to a period of slow  growth during which  the 
overhang  of excess  capital is "liquidated" have  often been made  in eco- 
nomics  (see DeLong,  1991). But it appears, to me at least, hard to sustain 
a claim that we  are in such a situation today. With the prices of IT goods 
falling as rapidly as they are, surely real capital-output ratios in IT sectors 
are below  their long-run values. In such a case, it makes no sense to claim 
that there is a capital overhang  to be "liquidated": such a claim requires 
that the ratio of the real stock of IT capital to output  be above  its long- 
run level.  Investment  in the near future in many  IT sectors may be low, 
but low investment  seems much more likely to be attributable to low de- 
mand or to failures of appropriability of the products of investment  than 
to too much capital. 
2.2 INFORMATION  TECHNOLOGY  AND POST-W.W.  II 
ECONOMIC  GROWTH 
Compare our use of IT today with our predecessors'  use of IT half a cen- 
tury ago.11  The decade  of the 1950s saw  electronic computers  largely re- 
place  mechanical  and  electromechanical  calculators  and  sorters  as  the 
world's  automated calculating devices.  By the end of the 1950s there were 
roughly  2000 installed  computers  in the world:  machines  like  Reming- 
ton Rand UNIVACs, IBM 702s, or DEC PDP-ls.  The processing  power  of 
these machines averaged perhaps 10,000 machine instructions per second. 
Today, talking rough orders of magnitude  only, there are perhaps 300 
million  active computers  in the world  with  processing  power  averaging 
several  hundred  million  instructions  per  second.  Two  thousand  com- 
puters times  10,000 instructions per second  is 20 million.  Three hundred 
million  computers  times,  say,  300 million  instructions  per second  is 90 
quadrillion-a  4-billion-fold  increase in the world's  raw automated com- 
putational power in forty years, an average annual rate of growth of 56%. 
Such a sustained  rate of productivity  improvement  at such  a pace  is 
unprecedented  in our history. Moreover, there is every reason to believe 
that this pace of productivity  growth  in the leading  sectors will  continue 
for decades.  More than a generation  ago Intel Corporation's  co-founder 
Gordon  Moore  noticed  what  has  come  to be  called  Moore's  law-that 
improvements  in semiconductor  fabrication allow manufacturers to dou- 
11. For an extended  version  of this part of the argument, see Cohen, DeLong, and Zysman 
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ble the density  of transistors on a chip every eighteen  months.  The scale 
of investment  needed  to make  Moore's  law  hold  (Figure 1) has  grown 
exponentially  along with  the density  of transistors and circuits, but the 
law has continued  to hold,  and engineers  see no immediate  barriers that 
will bring the process  of improvement  to a halt anytime  soon. 
2.2.1 Investment Spending  As the computer revolution  proceeded,  nomi- 
nal spending  on IT capital rose (Figure 2) from about 1% of GDP in 1960 
to about 2% of GDP by 1980 to about 3% of GDP by 1990 to between  5% 
and  6% of GDP by  2000. All  throughout  this time,  Moore's  law  meant 
that the real price of IT capital was falling as well. As the nominal spend- 
ing share of GDP spent  on IT capital grew  at a rate of 5% per year, the 
measured  price of information-processing  equipment  plus  software  fell 
steadily  at a pace between  5% and 10% per year. 
At chain-weighted  real values  constructed  using  1996 as a base year, 
real investment  in IT equipment  and software  was  equal to 1.7%  of real 
GDP  in  1987 (although  it is important  to remember  that this  does  not 
mean that real investment in IT equipment plus software was a 1.7%  share 
Figure 1 REAL  INVESTMENT  IN INFORMATION  TECHNOLOGY 
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Figure 2 NOMINAL  SPENDING ON INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
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of GDP; in the world of chain-weighted  statistics, real components  do not 
sum to their aggregate).  By 2000 it was  equal to 6.8% of real GDP.12  The 
steep  rise in real investment  in information-processing  equipment  (and 
software) drove a steep rise in total real investment  in equipment: by and 
large, the boom  in real investment  in information-processing  equipment 
driven by rapid technological  progress  and the associated  price declines 
was  an addition  to, not a shift in, the composition  of overall real equip- 
ment investment. 
2.2.2  Macro  Consequences  A  naive  back-of-the-envelope  calculation 
would  suggest  that this sharp rise in equipment  investment  was  of suffi- 
cient magnitude  to drive  substantial productivity  acceleration: at a total 
social rate of return to investment  of 15% per year, a 6-percentage-point 
rise in the investment  share would be predicted to boost the rate of growth 
of real gross product by at least about 1 percentage  point per year. And 
12. For an excellent  overview  of  what  forms  of  addition  and  comparison  are or are not 
legitimate  using  real chain-weighted  values,  see Whelan (2000a). 122  DELONG 
that is the same  order of magnitude  as the 1.0- to 1.6-percentage-point 
acceleration in annual labor productivity  growth rates seen in the second 
half of the 1990s. 
The acceleration in the growth rate of labor productivity  (Figure 3) and 
of real GDP in the second  half of the 1990s effectively  wiped  out all the 
effects of the post-1973 productivity  slowdown.  The U.S. economy  in the 
second half of the 1990s was, according to official statistics and measure- 
ments, performing as well in terms of economic growth as it had routinely 
performed in the first post-W.W. II generation. It is a marker of how much 
expectations  had been changed by the 1973-1995  period of slow  growth 
that 1995-2001  growth  was  viewed  as extraordinary and remarkable. 
Nevertheless,  the acceleration of growth in the second half of the 1990s 
was large enough  to leave a large mark on the economy  even in the rela- 
tively short time it has been in effect. Real output per person-hour worked 
in the nonfarm business  sector today is 10% higher than one would  have 
predicted  back in 1995 by extrapolating  the 1973-1995  trend. That such 
a large increase in the average level  of productivity  can be accumulated 
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over  a mere seven  years just by  getting  back to what  seemed  "normal" 
before 1973 is an index of the size and importance of the 1973-1995  pro- 
ductivity  slowdown. 
2.2.3 Cyclical  Factors  Alongside  the burst of growth in output per person- 
hour  worked  came  significantly  better  labor-market performance  (Fig- 
ure 4). The unemployment  rate consistent with stable inflation, which had 
been  somewhere  between  6% and  7% of the labor force from the early 
1980s into the early 1990s, suddenly  fell to 5% or even  lower  in the late 
1990s. All estimates  of nonaccelerating-inflation  rates of unemployment 
(NAIRUs) are hazardous  and uncertain,13  but long before 2001 the chance 
that the inflation-unemployment  process  was  a series of random draws 
from the same urn after as before  1995 was  negligible. 
This large downward  shift in the NAIRU posed  significant  problems 
for anyone  wishing  to estimate  the growth  of the economy's  productive 
13. See Staiger, Stock, and Watson  (1997). 124  DELONG 
potential  over the  1990s. Was this fall in the NAIRU  a permanent  shift 
that raised the economy's  level  of potential  output? Was it a transitory 
result of good  news  on the supply-shock  front-falling  rates of increase 
in  medical  costs,  falling  oil  prices,  falling  other  import  prices,  and  so 
forth-that  would  soon be reversed? If the fall in the NAIRU was perma- 
nent,  then presumably  it produced  a once-and-for-all jump in the level 
of potential  output,  not  an acceleration  of the  growth  rate of potential 
output.  But how  large a once-and-for-all jump? Okun's law would  sug- 
gest that a 2-percentage-point  decline  in the unemployment  rate would 
be associated  with  a 5% increase in output. 
Production-funtion-based  analyses,  however,  would  suggest  that a 2- 
percentage-point  decline  in the unemployment  rate would  be associated 
with  a roughly  1.5% increase  in output.  One  must  take account  of the 
effect of falling unemployment  on the labor force and the differential im- 
pact of the change  in unemployment  on the skilled  and the educated. 
However,  none  of the other available  cyclical indicators  suggest  that 
the late-1990s  economy  was  an unusually  high-pressure  economy.  The 
average workweek  (Figure 5) was no higher in 2000, when the unemploy- 
ment rate approached 4% than it had been in 1993, when  the unemploy- 
ment rate fluctuated between  6% and 7%. 
Capacity utilization  (Figure 6) was  lower  during the late 1990s than it 
had been  during  the late 1980s, when  unemployment  had been  1.5 per- 
centage  points  higher.14 Low  and  not  rising  inflation,  a relatively  short 
workweek,  and  relatively  low  capacity  utilization-these  all suggested 
that the fall in the unemployment  rate in the late 1990s was not associated 
with  the kind of high-pressure  economy  assumed  by Okun's law. 
3. A Simple  Model 
Given  that the acceleration in productivity  growth  in the second  half of 
the 1990s was primarily driven by the revolution  in IT, what conclusions 
can be drawn about the likely pace of productivity  growth in the future? 
The first step in answering  this question is to write down  a simple model 
that has at least some traction on the major issues. The second step is then 
to use  that model  to analyze  future productivity  growth.  And  the third 
step is to step back from the model,  and to consider  the importance  of 
the factors that the model  leaves  out. 
The simple model will be one in which there is (1) an ongoing  techno- 
logical revolution  in the production of data-processing  and data-commu- 
14. One reason, however,  for the low  measured  capacity utilization  in the late 1990s was 
the belief that high  levels  of investment  were  expanding  capacity at a furious  rate. Productivity  Growth  in the  2000s ? 125 
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nications  capital, which  is  (2) an important  input  into  production.  The 
analysis of the model will largely turn on whether there is reason to antici- 
pate  that the pace  of technological  progress  in IT is going  to slow,  that 
the share of GDP spent on IT investment  is going  to decline,  or that the 
share of national  product  attributable to returns earned  on the existing 
IT capital stock is going  to fall. Yet if none of the three of these happens, 
then  this growth-theory  finger exercise  predicts  that we  can expect  the 
medium-run  future to be as bright for measured  productivity  growth  as 
the recent past has been. 
The third stage consists of analyzing  the four hole cards-four  reasons 
to think that the future is likely to be brighter than the simplest  possible 
model  suggests.  First, the elasticity  of demand  for IT is likely to remain 
high-which  means that as prices fall, expenditure  shares will not remain 
constant but will rise, boosting growth. Second, the long-time trend shows 
the income  share attributable to IT capital rising: it would  be surprising 
if this forty-year trend suddenly  stopped  today, and rising income shares 
of IT boost growth as well. Third, Basu, Ferald,  and Shapiro take adjust- 126 * DELONG 
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ment costs in investment  seriously,  and conclude  that late-1990s growth 
undershot  trend growth by about 0.5 percentage points per year. Fourth, 
Paul  David  has  argued  for  decades  that  general-purpose  technologies 
boost labor productivity  in two stages: (1) first, capital deepening;  (2) sec- 
ond, social learning about how  to use new  technologies  efficiently, a pro- 
cess that drives rapid TFP growth for an extensive  period of time but that 
cannot begin  until diffusion  is nearly complete. 
Surely not all of these will turn out to be valuable face cards. But I think 
it highly unlikely that none of them will win any hands. And I think they 
are likely to outweigh  the only possible  hole card on the pessimistic  side 
that I can think of-large-scale  governmental  failure in setting forth the 
institutional  framework to support information-age  markets. Productivity  Growth  in the  2000s ? 127 
3.1 BASIC  THEORY 
Suppose  that the economy  produces two types of output-regular  goods, 
which  we  will  denote  by  a superscript  r, and IT capital, which  we  will 
denote by an i. At each moment in time there is a set cost price pt at which 
output  in the form of regular goods  can be transformed  into IT capital 
and vice versa. 
Let the economy  produce  two types  of output-regular  goods,  which 
we will denote by an r, and IT capital, which we will denote by an i. And 
let at each moment  in time  the relative  price of IT goods  be  a constant 
pi,  at which  output in the form of regular goods  can be traded off into IT 
capital and vice versa. Thus 
Yt =  Yr +  piYi.  (1) 
With regular goods  serving  as numeraire, the total output  Yt is equal to 
the output  Yr of regular goods  plus  ptYt, the output  of IT capital multi- 
plied  by its current cost price. 
The  total  output  Yt is  itself  determined  by  a  standard  production 
function: 
Yt =  F(At, K , K\, Lt),  (2) 
where At is the exogenous  level of TFP, Kr is the stock of normal (non-IT) 
capital, K\ is the stock of IT capital, and Lt is the labor force. 
Suppose  further that because  of ongoing  technological  revolutions  the 
cost price of IT is declining  at a constant proportional  rate R. Now  note 
that Yt is not a measure of real output-real  output will grow faster than 
Yt  as pt falls, because the ability to make IT goods more cheaply is a source 
of productivity  growth as well. I will use Y* to stand for a chain-weighted 
measure  of  real  output  so  that  we  capture  this  additional  source  of 
growth. 
Then in this framework  the proportional  rate of growth  of real chain- 
weighted  real output  Y* will  be 
d In Y*  aF Ad  ln At +  F K d ln Kr 
dt  aA Y  dt  aKr  Y  dt 
F K_  d ln K  aF L d ln Lt  +  +  -  +  XIn. 
aKi Y  dt  aL Y  dt  (3) 
The rate of growth of real output will be equal to contributions from labor, 
normal  capital, IT capital, and TFP in the production  of regular output, 128 *  DELONG 
plus  an extra term equal  to the share of total expenditure  on IT capital 
Xti times the rate n at which  the cost price of IT goods  is declining. 
Under  the assumptions  of constant  returns to scale and  competition, 
(aF/aK)(K/Y)  and like terms are simply  the shares  of national  income 
appropriated by each of the three factors of production.  So let us use si, 
Sr,  and SL  as a shorthand for those terms, and also normalize the TFP term 
A, and thus rewrite (3) as 
d lnY  d  n  d  In  KA  d  In  K  d In Lt 
t  +  s,  +  Si  +  SL  +  X  .  (4)  dt  dt  dt  dt  dt  dt  t 
If we  assume  a constant proportional  growth rate n for the labor force, a 
constant growth rate a for TFP in the production  of normal output Y, and 
constant shares of nominal expenditure  Xr and Xi on normal and IT gross 
investment,  then (4) becomes 
d In Y*  /Xry  \  y  d ln  Y  =  a  +  sLn +  S(  -  +  i  +  x  (5) 
And  if we  are willing  to impose  constant  returns to  scale  in the  three 
factors of labor, normal  capital, and IT capital, then we  can rewrite  (5) 
with  the rate of growth  of labor productivity  on the left-hand side  as 
d ln(Y'/Lt)=  a +  ry  r  \(X  &i?  ?  (  ~ 1,/Va  /T  a +  Sr  (str+  n)  + Si  X  (Yi+  n  +X'7c.  (6) 
dt  Kr  S  iK' 
3.2 IMPLICATIONS  OF BASIC  THEORY 
The first two  terms  on  the right-hand  side  are very  standard: the TFP 
growth a, and the contribution from the deepening  of the ratio of normal 
capital per worker: 
Kr  -  (sr +  ))  (7) 
equal  to  the  normal  capital share Sr times  the  net  proportional  rate of 
growth  of the normal capital stock-its  expenditure  share Xr divided  by 
the capital-output  ratio Kr/Y, minus  the labor-force growth  rate n plus 
the depreciation  rate 8r. 
But there are the two  extra terms. The second  term, 
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is what Oliner and Sichel refer to as the "additional growth  contribution 
...  com[ing] through efficiency improvement  in the production  of comput- 
ing equipment."  Even if the level  of potential  normal output were to re- 
main constant, the fact that the economy  is able to make IT capital more 
and more cheaply  in terms of normal  goods  is a genuine  improvement 
in productivity. 
The first term, 
(X  KPi)Y  (i  +  n))  (9) 
is the contribution  to the production  of normal  output  from the net in- 
crease in IT capital stock per worker. However  the numerator is not the 
nominal  share of GDP expended  on IT capital Xi, but the real share Xi/ 
pt.  And-because  the cost price  of IT capital is falling  at the rate n-a 
constant nominal expenditure share means that the real expenditure share 
relevant for the contribution of IT capital to output growth is growing  at 
a proportional  rate n. It is no surprise at all that as long  as the nominal 
expenditure  share on IT capital remains  constant  and the technological 
revolution  is ongoing,  the economy  exhibits  a steadily  rising  real gross 
investment  expenditure  share X'/pt,  and a steadily  rising ratio of real IT 
capital to normal output.15 
This is in fact what  happened  in the original industrial  revolution:  as 
the dynamic modem  sector grew to encompass  the bulk of the economy, 
overall productivity  growth  accelerated.16  The heroic age of double-digit 
annual productivity  increase within the steam-power  and textile-spinning 
sectors of the economy  ended before the nineteenth century was a quarter 
over. Yet the major contribution of steam power and textile machinery to 
British aggregate  economic  growth  took place  in the middle  half of the 
nineteenth  century.  Thus historians  of  the  British industrial  revolution 
like Landes (1969) focus on the late eighteenth  century, while macroecon- 
omists  and  sociologists  focus  on the mid-nineteenth  century: the lag in 
time between  the major innovations  and fastest proportional  growth  of 
the leading  sector on the one hand, and its major influence on aggregates 
on the other, is likely to be substantial. 
If we follow  Whelan (2001) and define as auxiliary variables the nomi- 
15. There are some  subtleties  about what  is the right way  to measure  output  and how  to 
define  a "steady state" in models  like this. Exactly what  is the most  useful  way  is in- 
sightfully  explored  by Whelan  (2001). 
16. See Crafts (1985). 130  DELONG 
nal regular capital-output  ratio Kc  and the nominal  current-dollar-value 
IT capital-output  ratio Kr  by 
Kr 
yc  =  (10) 
(11) 
Yt 
then we can construct a pseudo-steady-state  path for this economy.  In the 
equation  for the proportional  rate of change of regular output  Y, 
d  n(Yt/L)  = a + 
Xr 
K  -t 
(6r  +  s,)  +  IY  (6i +  n)),  (12) 
dt  K  rpK  Kt 
we  can substitute  in these  auxiliary nominal  capital-output  ratios: 
d  ln(Yt/Lt)  =  a+  S  +  sn)+ 
,X 
(6r  +  (  n)  (13) 
dt  K  ; 
and then derive  rates of change  of these ratios: 
dK-=  (1  -  s)Xr  -  [a  +  (1  -  Sr)(r  +  n) 
- 
si(i  +  n)]K-  sXi(t  (14) 
dt  \K}/ 
dK=i  (1-  si)Xi-[a  + 7- +  (1 -  si)(i  +  n)-  Sr(r  +  n)]Ki -  SrXr  Kt).  (15) 
dt  \Kj 
We also substitute the nominal  capital-output  ratios into the production 
function: 
Y=  At  Kt1  f(K  'i  (16) 
Lt  Lt,  Lt 
to obtain 
Yt =  A1/(  1-sr-si)(Kr)Sr/(1-sr-Si)(Ki)si/(-Sr-i)(p)  -s/(-Sr-si).  (17) 
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The dynamics  of output per worker in the economy  can then be analyzed 
in terms of the  (constant) proportional  increase  in the TFP A, the  (con- 
stant) proportional  decrease  in the real cost price  of IT goods,  and  the 
dynamic  evolution  of the nominal  capital-output  ratios: 
d ln(Yt/Lt)  =  a  +  si 
dt  1  -  SSi  1  -  Sr-  Si 
Sr  d In K  +  si  d In Kc 
1  -  Sr -  i  dt  1  -  Sr- Si  dt  (18) 
From (14), (15), and (18), we can calculate the behavior of the economy 
in  its  long-run  pseudo-steady  state.  We  can  see  that  the  proportional 
growth  rate of Y/L  will be 
d ln(Yt/Lt)  _  a  +  Si1 
dt  1  -  S  -  Si  1  -  Sr-  Si 
and the long-run  growth  rate of real output  per worker will  be 
d ln(Y*/  Lt)  a  n 
si  d ln(Y/  Lt) =  a  +  s  Xixl,  (20) 
dt  1  -  Sr  - 
Si  1  -  Sr  - 
Si 
which is the sum of three terms: a term capturing the effect of background 
TFP growth  a on  the economy,  a term capturing  the  effect  of  ongoing 
capital deepening  made  possible  by falling IT capital prices, and a term 
capturing the direct effect of improvements  in efficiency in the production 
of IT goods. 
How  to  calibrate this  simple  theoretical  result  (20) to  the  American 
economy?  Over the years since 1995, X -the  share of expenditure  on IT 
and related forms of capital-has  averaged  some  6% of GDP. According 
to Oliner and Sichel (2000), si-the  share of income attributable to IT capi- 
tal-has  averaged  7%  of GDP. Assuming  an income share for other kinds 
of capital of 33%, then at a 10%-per-year decline  in the real prices of IT 
goods  the  last  two  terms-the  acceleration  terms-of  equation  (20) 
amount  to a productivity-growth  boost of 1.8% per year. This is a larger 
boost to growth than was in fact seen in the acceleration in the later 1990s. 
Thus this growth accounting exercise certainly does not suggest  that pro- 
ductivity  growth in the next decade will be lower than in the recent past, 
as long as Moore's law continues  to hold and the prices of IT goods  con- 
tinue to decline  rapidly. 132  DELONG 
However,  there is no  special  reason  to think that such  a steady-state 
analysis is the best we can do. The steady state assumes  constant nominal 
investment  shares in IT capital, a constant  rate of real price decrease  in 
this technologically  explosive  leading sector, and a constant share param- 
eter s,. Yet all the evidence  we  have suggests  that all three of these vari- 
ables  move,  and  move  radically,  in  a  decade  or  less.  The  American 
economy  began  the  1980s very  far away  from  its  pseudo-steady  state: 
back then the GDP share of nominal spending  on IT investment  was only 
40% of its current value,  and likewise  for the share of national  income 
attributable to the IT capital stock. 
Thus the potential importance of the first hole card: economies  that are 
approaching their steady-state  growth paths from below  grow faster than 
in steady  state. With two kinds of capital goods  depreciating  at different 
Figure 7 SAMPLE  SIMULATIONS:  SPEED  OF CONVERGENCE  TO THE 
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rates, the simple model has no theoretically tractable dynamics. However, 
simulations  (Figure 7) suggest  that it is overwhelmingly  likely that in such 
a case the nominal capital-output  ratio for the most rapidly depreciating 
kind of capital converges  fairly rapidly-within  two decades-to  a value 
near its steady-state  value. 
This suggests  that any additional  contribution to growth from conver- 
gence  dynamics  will  be confined  to the next decade  or so. 
4. A Demand-Side  Model 
4.1  A MODEL OF CHANGING  DEMAND  SHARES 
However,  this leaves  unexamined  the question  of why  the income  and 
expenditure  shares of IT capital have been rising so rapidly over the past 
several  decades.  In order to even  grapple with  these questions,  we  have 
to look on the demand-for-IT side. What determines whether the demand 
for IT capital and thus for investment  grows more rapidly or less rapidly 
than output  as a whole? 
An alternative approach is to simplify the production  side of the model 
radically, and instead  focus  on the implications  of changing  prices of IT 
goods  for demand.  If the TFP in the rest of the economy  is growing  at a 
rate nR,  and if the TFP in the leading  industries  and sectors is growing  at 
a faster rate nL,  then the TFP growth  in the economy  as a whole  will  be 
equal to 
7  =  OcCL  +  (1  -  T)nR,  (21) 
where  a  is the share of total expenditure  on the goods  produced  by the 
economy's  fast-growing  technologically  dynamic  leading  sectors. 
As the process of innovation and technological revolution in the leading 
sectors proceeds,  we would  not expect the leading  sector share a of total 
expenditure  to  remain  constant.  If the  goods  produced  by  the  leading 
sector have a high  (or low) price elasticity of demand,  the falls over time 
in their relative prices will boost (or reduce) the share of total expenditure 
a: only  if  the  price  elasticity  of  demand,  Ep,  is  one  will  the  fall in  the 
relative  price  of leading-sector  products  produced  by  the technological 
revolutions  leave  the leading-sector  share unchanged.17 
17. The demand  share will  also depend  on the income  elasticity  of demand.  If the goods 
produced  by the leading  sectors  are superior  (or inferior) goods,  the share a  will  rise 
(or fall) as economic  growth  continues:  only  if the income  elasticity  of demand,  c,, for 
its products is one will changes in the overall level of prosperity leave the leading sector 
share unchanged.  But I will  not model  this effect here. 134  DELONG 
Moreover, the leading-sector  share of total expenditure  o matters only 
as long  as the leading  sector remains technologically  dynamic.  Once the 
heroic phase  of invention  and innovation  comes  to an end  and the rate 
of TFP growth returns to the economy's  normal background level 7R, the 
rate of productivity  growth in the economy  as a whole  will return to that 
same level 7R and the leading-sector  share of expenditure a will no longer 
be relevant. 
Thus four pieces  of information  are necessary  to assess  the aggregate 
economic impact of an explosion  of invention  and innovation in a leading 
sector: 
The initial share of expenditure  on the leading  sector's products,  o0. 
The magnitude  of the relative pace of cost reduction,  XL -  nR, during the 
leading  sector's heroic age of invention  and innovation. 
The duration of the leading sector's heroic age of invention and innovation. 
The price elasticity  of demand,  ep, for the leading  sector's products. 
To gain  a sense  of the importance  of these  factors, let's  consider  a few 
simulations  with  sample  parameter values.  For simplicity's  sake, set the 
initial share of expenditure  on the leading  sector's products,  o0,  equal to 
0.02; set the income elasticity of demand for the leading sector's products, 
?j, equal to 1.0; set the heroic age of invention  and innovation  to a period 
40 years long; and set the background level of TFP growth,  nR,  to 0.01 per 
year. Consider three values  for the price elasticity of demand,  ep:  0.5, 2.0, 
and  4.0. And  consider  two  values  for the wedge  in the annual  rate of 
technological  progress between  the leading  sector and the rest: 0.03 and 
0.05. 
With a price elasticity  of demand  of 0.5, the expenditure  share of the 
leading  sectors declines  from its original value  of 2% as technology  ad- 
vances  and  the prices  of leading-sector  goods  fall. With a productivity 
wedge  of 5% per year, the initial rate of growth of economy-wide  produc- 
tivity  growth  is 1.1% per year-1%  from the background  growth  of the 
rest  of  the  economy,  and  an  extra  0.1% from  the  faster  productivity 
growth  in the one-fiftieth  of the economy  that is the leading  sector. By 
the  twelfth  year  the  expenditure  share  on  leading-sector  products  has 
fallen below  1.5%. By the twenty-eighth  year it has fallen below  1.0%. By 
the fortieth year it has fallen to 0.7%. 
The low initial and declining  share of the leading  sector in total expen- 
diture  means  that 40 years  of  6%-per-year productivity  growth  in  the 
leading  sector has only a very limited impact on the total economy.  After 
40 years, the total productivity  in the economy  as a whole  is only 2.54% 
higher than if the leading sector had not existed at all. Rapid productivity Productivity  Growth  in the  2000s ? 135 
growth in the leading  sector has next to no effect on productivity  growth 
in the economy  as a whole, because the salience of the leading sector falls, 
and  the salience  of other sectors resistant  to productivity  improvement 
rises, as technology  advances.  This is Baumol  and Bowen's  (1966) "cost 
disease"  scenario: innovations  become  less  and  less  important  because 
the innovation-resistant  share of the economy  rises over time. Indeed, as 
time passes  the rate of aggregate  growth converges  to the rate of growth 
in the productivity-resistant  rest of the economy. 
By contrast, with  a price  elasticity  of  4 the expenditure  share of  the 
leading  sectors grows  rapidly  from its original value  of 2%. With a pro- 
ductivity-growth  wedge  of 5%  per year, the leading-sector share of spend- 
ing  surpasses  10% by year 12 and 30% by  year 20, and reaches 89% by 
year 40. As the spending  share of the leading  sectors rises, aggregate pro- 
ductivity  growth  rises  too: from  1.1% per year at the  start to  1.4% per 
year by year 10, 2.4% per year by year 20, 4.2% per year by year 30, and 
5.4% per year by year 40. The impact on the aggregate economy  is enor- 
mous: the TFP after 40 years is 113%  higher than it would  have been had 
the leading  sector never existed. 
There is only one reason for the sharp difference in the effects of innova- 
tion  in the  leading  sector: the different  price elasticities  of demand  for 
leading-sector  products in the two scenarios. The initial shares of leading- 
sector products  in demand,  the rate of technology  improvement  in the 
leading  sector, and the duration of the technology  boom are all the same. 
But when  the demand  for leading-sector  products  is price-elastic,  each 
advance  in technology  and reduction  in the leading  sector's costs raises 
the salience of the leading  sector in the economy  and thus brings the pro- 
portional  rate of growth  of the aggregate  economy  closer to the rate of 
growth  in the leading  sector itself.  By the end  of the 40-year period  of 
these  simulations,  the scenario with  the price elasticity of 4 has seen the 
leading sectors practically take over the economy,  and dominate demand. 
This is the "true economic  revolution" scenario: not only does productiv- 
ity growth  accelerate substantially  and material welfare increase, but the 
structure  of  the economy  is transformed  as the bulk  of the labor force 
shifts  into  producing  leading-sector  products  and  the bulk  of  final de- 
mand  shifts into consuming  leading-sector  products. 
What determines  whether  demand  for a leading  sector's  products  is 
price-inelastic  (in which  case we  are in Baumol  and Bowen's  "cost dis- 
ease" scenario in which technological progress in the leading sector barely 
affects the aggregate  economy  at all) or price-elastic  (in which  case we 
are  in  the  "economic  revolution"  scenario,  and  everything  is  trans- 
formed)? What determines the income and price elasticities of demand for 
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4.2 HOW USEFUL  WILL  COMPUTERS  BE? 
What factors determine  what  the ultimate  impact  of these  technologies 
will be? What is there that could interrupt a bright forecast for productiv- 
ity growth over the next decade? There are three possibilities:  The first is 
the end of the era of technological revolution-the  end of the era of declin- 
ing  prices  of  IT capital. The second  is a steep  fall in the  share of total 
nominal  expenditure  devoted  to IT capital. And  the third is a steep  fall 
in the social marginal product  of investment  in IT-or,  rather, a fall in 
the product  of  the  social  return on  investment  and  the  capital-output 
ratio. The important thing to focus on in forecasting is that none of these 
have  happened:  In  1991-1995  semiconductor  production  was  0.5% of 
nonfarm business  output; in 1996-2000 it averaged 0.9%.  Nominal  spend- 
ing  on  IT capital  rose  from  about  1% of  GDP in  1960 to  about  2% by 
1980 to about 3% by 1990 to between  5% and 6% by 2000. Computer and 
semiconductor  prices declined  at 15-20% per year from 1991 to 1995 and 
at 25-35% per year from 1996 to 2000. 
However,  whether nominal expenditure  shares will continue to rise in 
the end hinges  on how  useful  data processing  and data communication 
products  turn out to be. What will  be the elasticity of demand  for high- 
technology  goods as their prices continue to drop? The greater is the num- 
ber of different uses found  for high-tech products  as their prices decline, 
the larger will be the income  and price elasticities  of demand-and  thus 
the  stronger  will  be  the  forces  pushing  the  expenditure  share  up,  not 
down,  as technological  advance  continues.  All of the history of the elec- 
tronics sector suggests  that these elasticities  are high, nor low.  Each suc- 
cessive  generation  of  falling  prices  appears  to  produce  new  uses  for 
computers  and communications  equipment  at an astonishing  rate. 
The first, very expensive  computers  were  seen  as good  at performing 
complicated  and lengthy  sets of arithmetic operations. The first leading- 
edge  applications  of large-scale  electronic  computing  power  were  mili- 
tary: the burst of innovation  during World War II that produced  the first 
one-of-a-kind hand-tooled  electronic computers was totally funded by the 
war effort. The coming  of the Korean War won  IBM its first contract to 
actually  deliver  a computer:  the million-dollar  Defense  Calculator. The 
military demand in the 1950s and the 1960s by projects such as Whirlwind 
and  SAGE (Semi-Automatic  Ground  Environment)-a  strategic  air de- 
fense system-both  filled the assembly  lines of computer manufacturers 
and trained the generation  of engineers  that designed  and built them. 
The first leading-edge  civilian economic  applications  of large-for  the 
time  (the 1950s)-amounts  of computer  power  came  from government 
agencies  like the Census  and from industries  like insurance and finance, 
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amounts of paper. The first UNIVAC computer was bought by the Census 
Bureau. The second  and third orders came from A.C. Nielson  Market Re- 
search  and  the  Prudential  Insurance  Company.  This  second,  slightly 
cheaper generation of computers was used not to make sophisticated  cal- 
culations,  but to make the extremely  simple  calculations  needed  by the 
Census  and by  the human-resource  departments  of large corporations. 
The Census  Bureau used  computers  to  replace  their electromechanical 
tabulating machines. Businesses used computers to do the payroll, report- 
generating,  and record-analyzing  tasks that their own  electromechanical 
calculators had previously  performed. 
The still next  generation  of computers-exemplified  by  the IBM 360 
series-were  used to stuff data into and pull data out of databases in real 
time-airline  reservation  processing  systems,  insurance  systems,  inven- 
tory control. It became clear that the computer was  good  for much more 
than performing repetitive calculations at high speed.  The computer was 
much  more  than  a calculator, however  large and  however  fast. It was 
also an organizer. American Airlines used computers to create its SABRE 
automated reservations system, which cost as much as a dozen  airplanes. 
The insurance industry automated  its back-office sorting and classifying. 
Subsequent  uses  have  included  computer-aided  product  design,  ap- 
plied  to  everything  from  airplanes  designed  without  wind  tunnels  to 
pharmaceuticals  designed  at the molecular  level  for particular applica- 
tions.  In this  area and  in  other  applications,  the  major function  of  the 
computer is not as a calculator, a tabulator, or a database manager, but as 
a what-if machine. The computer creates models  of what would  happen if 
the airplane, the molecule,  the business,  or the document  were to be built 
up in a particular way. It thus enables an amount and a degree of experi- 
mentation  in the virtual world  that would  be prohibitively  expensive  in 
resources  and time in the real world. 
The value of this use as a what-if machine took most computer scientists 
and computer  manufacturers by surprise. None  of the engineers  design- 
ing software for the IBM 360 series, none of the parents of Berkeley UNIX, 
nobody  before  Dan  Bricklin programmed  Visicalc  had  any  idea  of  the 
utility  of  a spreadsheet  program.  Yet the  invention  of  the  spreadsheet 
marked the spread of computers  into the office as a what-if machine. In- 
deed,  the computerization  of Americas  white-collar  offices  in the  1980s 
was  largely  driven  by  the spreadsheet  program's  utility-first  Visicalc, 
then Lotus 1-2-3, and finally Microsoft Excel. 
For one example of the importance of a computer as a what-if machine, 
consider that today's complex  designs  for new  semiconductors  would  be 
simply impossible  without  automated design tools. The process has come 
full  circle. Progress  in computing  depends  upon  Moore's  law; and  the 138  DELONG 
progress  in semiconductors  that makes possible  the continued  march of 
Moore's law  depends  upon  progress  in computers  and software. 
As increasing computer power  has enabled  their use in real-time con- 
trol, the domain has expanded  further as lead users have figured out new 
applications.  Production  and  distribution  processes  have  been  and  are 
being transformed. Moreover, it is not just robotic auto painting or assem- 
bly that have become possible, but scanner-based retail quick-turn supply 
chains and robot-guided  hip surgery as well. 
In the most recent years the evolution  of the computer and its uses has 
continued.  It has branched along two quite different paths. First, comput- 
ers have  burrowed  inside  conventional  products  as they  have  become 
embedded  systems.  Second, computers  have connected  outside  to create 
what we call the World Wide Web: a distributed global database of infor- 
mation  all accessible  through  the single  global network.  Paralleling  the 
revolution  in data-processing  capacity  has been  a similar revolution  in 
data communications  capacity. There is no sign that the domain of poten- 
tial uses  has been exhausted. 
One  would  have  to  be  pessimistic  indeed  to  forecast  that  all  these 
trends  are about  to come  to an end.  One way  to put  it is that modem 
semiconductor-based  electronics technologies  fit Bresnahan and Trajtenb- 
erg's (1995) definition  of a general-purpose  technology-one  useful not just 
for one narrow class but for an extremely wide variety of production pro- 
cesses,  one  for which  each decline  in price  appears  to bring  forth new 
uses, one that can spark off a long-lasting  major economic transformation. 
There is room  for computerization  to grow  on the intensive  margin, as 
computer use saturates potential markets like office work and email. But 
there is also room to grow  on the extensive  margin, as microprocessors 
are used for tasks (like controlling hotel-room doors or changing the burn 
mix  of  a  household  furnace)  that  few,  two  decades  ago,  would  have 
thought  of. 
5. Additional  Considerations 
Moreover, the analysis so far has left out a substantial number of impor- 
tant considerations. 
5.1 PREVIOUS  INDUSTRIAL  REVOLUTIONS 
The first of these is that previous industrial revolutions  driven by general- 
purpose  technologies  have seen an initial wave  of adoption  followed  by 
rapid TFP growth  in industries  that use these new  technologies  as busi- 
nesses  and workers  lear  by using.  So far this has not been  true of our Productivity  Growth  in the  2000s ? 139 
current wave of growth. As Robert Gordon (2002) has pointed out at every 
opportunity,  there has been little if any acceleration of TFP growth outside 
of the making of high-tech equipment itself: the boosts to labor productiv- 
ity look very  much  like what  one would  expect  from capital deepening 
alone,  not what  one  would  expect  from the fact that the new  forms  of 
capital allow  more efficient organizations. 
Paul David  (1991) at least has  argued  that a very  large chunk  of the 
long-run impact of technological  revolutions  does emerge only when peo- 
ple have a chance to thoroughly  learn the characteristics of the new  tech- 
nology  and to reconfigure  economic  activity  to take advantage  of it. In 
David's  view,  it took nearly half a century before the American economy 
had acquired enough experience with electric motors to begin to use them 
to  their  full  potential.  By  his  reckoning,  we  today  are  only  halfway 
through the process of economic  learning needed  for us to even begin to 
envision  what  computers  will  be truly useful  for. 
Moreover,  as Crafts (2002) argues,  the striking thing  is not that there 
was a "Solow paradox" of slow productivity  growth associated with com- 
puterization,  but that people  did not expect the economic  impact to start 
slow  and  gather  force over  time.  As  he writes,  "in the early phases  of 
general purpose  technologies  their impact on growth  is modest."  It has 
to be modest: "the new varieties of capital have only a small weight  rela- 
tive  to the economy  as a whole."  But if they  are truly general-purpose 
technologies,  their weight  will  grow. 
Susanto Basu's comment  on this paper suggests  that we  are finally be- 
ginning  to see  Paul David's  point  begin  to have  force. As  time  passes, 
it  looks  like  a larger  and  larger  share  of  the  TFP growth  acceleration 
is  coming  in  industries  outside  of  the  high-tech  sector-in  industries 
that are learning how  to use IT products  to boost their own  efficiency of 
operations. 
5.2 ADJUSTMENT  COSTS 
Basu, Fernald, and  Shapiro  (2001) estimate  that because  of  adjustment 
costs  productivity  growth  in the second  half of the  1990s undershot the 
long-run  technology  trend by half a percentage  point per year or more. 
Our standard models  tell us that investment  is more or less  stable over 
time because  adjustment  costs  are substantial: to invest  10% of national 
product  in equipment  this year and 2% the next is much worse  than in- 
vesting  a steady  6% in equipment.  But the  1990s saw  sudden,  unprece- 
dented, large shifts in real investment  shares. If our standard explanations 
of why investment  does not swing more wildly  are correct, then the penal- 
ties enforced  by adjustment  costs  on American  economic  growth  in the 
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As Martin Baily (2002) has observed, there is independent  evidence  for 
these adjustment costs: "microeconomic analyses of plants and firms find 
substantial adjustment costs to investment  and lags between  investment 
and productivity."  Thus it is highly naive to follow  "the growth account- 
ing approach," and to assume that "increases in capital intensity have an 
impact on productivity  in the same year" or even  the same five-year pe- 
riod in which  they occur. 
5.3 ECONOMIC  GOVERNANCE 
There is, however,  the one remaining hole card: the pessimistic  one. The 
government's  role  in  a market  economy  is  to  provide  the  underlying 
definitions of property rights, mechanisms  of rights enforcement, and cor- 
rections of externalities so that the price signals sent by the market to firms 
correspond  to economic  efficiency  and social values.  As the structure of 
the  economy  changes,  surely  the proper  government-provided  institu- 
tional underpinnings  must change  too. But is government  able to fulfill 
this market-structuring task? 
The  macroeconomist  tends  to  foresee  a  future  of  falling  high-tech 
prices, rising expenditure  shares, rapidly growing  capital-output  ratios, 
and  fast labor productivity  growth.  Yet as one  looks  at IT, one  cannot 
help but be struck by the fact that the most  far-reaching and important 
consequences  may well be microeconomic.  Issues of the benefits from the 
extent of the market, of price discrimination  and the distribution  of eco- 
nomic well-being,  of monopoly,  and of the interaction of intellectual prop- 
erty with  scientific  communication  and  research are all very  important 
and very complicated.  And if governments  fail to properly structure the 
micro marketplace,  then  optimistic  macro conclusions  will  be  immedi- 
ately cast into doubt. 
It is obvious  that the creation of knowledge  is a cumulative  enterprise: 
Isaac Newton  said  that the only  reason he was  able to see  farther than 
others was  that he stood  on the shoulders  of giants. Whenever  we  con- 
sider the importance  of property  rights over ideas  in giving  companies 
incentives  to fund  research and development,  we  need  to also consider 
the importance of free information exchange and use in giving researchers 
the power to do their jobs effectively. Can governments  construct intellec- 
tual-property  systems  that will  both enhance  information  exchange  and 
provide  sufficient monetary incentives?  It is an open  question. 
One possible  solution  may be price discrimination.  In the past, price 
discrimination-charging  one price to one consumer and a different price 
for essentially  the same good  to another consumer-has  been  seen  as a 
way  for monopolies  to further increase their monopoly  profits. In the in- 
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come to see price discrimination  as an essential  mechanism  for attaining 
economic  efficiency  and social welfare. 
Third, if we call the economy  of the past two centuries primarily Smith- 
ian, the economy  of the future is likely  to be primarily Schumpeterian.  In 
a Smithian economy,  the decentralized  market does  a magnificent job (if 
the  initial  distribution  of wealth  is satisfactory)  at producing  economic 
welfare. Since goods are rival-my  sleeping in this hotel bed tonight keeps 
you  from doing  so-one  person's  use  or consumption  imposes  a social 
cost: since good  economic  systems  align the incentives  facing individuals 
with the effects of their actions on social welfare, it makes sense to distrib- 
ute goods  by  charging prices equal to marginal  social cost. Since goods 
are excludable-we  have  social institutions  to enforce property rights, in 
the case of my hotel room the management,  the police,  and the courts- 
it is easy to decentralize  decision  making and control, pushing  responsi- 
bility for allocation away from the center and to the more entrepreneurial 
periphery  where  information  about the situation  on the ground  is likely 
to be much better. 
In a Schumpeterian  economy,  the decentralized  market does  a much 
less  good  job. Goods  are produced  under  conditions  of substantial  in- 
creasing returns to scale. This means  that competitive  equilibrium  is not 
a likely outcome: the canonical situation is more likely to be one of natural 
monopoly.  But natural monopoly  does not meet the most basic condition 
for economic  efficiency: that price equals marginal cost. However,  prices 
cannot beforced to be equal to marginal cost, because then the fixed setup 
costs  are not  covered.  Relying  on  government  subsidies  to  cover  fixed 
setup costs raises problems of its own: it destroys the entrepreneurial en- 
ergy of the market and replaces it with the group-think  and red-tape de- 
fects  of  admininstrative  bureaucracy.  Moreover,  in  a  Schumpeterian 
economy  it is innovation  that is the principal source of wealth-and  tem- 
porary monopoly  power  and profits are the reward needed  to spur pri- 
vate enterprise to engage in such innovation. The right way to think about 
this complex  set of issues  is not clear. The competitive  paradigm  cannot 
be fully  appropriate. But it is not clear what  is. 
Consider, for example, the U.S. Gilded Age toward the end of the nine- 
teenth century. The Gilded Age saw the coming  of mass production,  the 
large corporation,  the continent-wide  market, and electric power  to the 
United  States. You needed  more  than the improvements  in production 
technology  that made  possible  the large-scale  factory in order to arrive 
at  the  large  industrial  organization  and  the  high-productivity,  mass- 
production  economy.  From our viewpoint  today  we  can look back and 
say that in the United  States this economic  transformation rested on five 
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Limited liability. 
The stock market. 
Investment  banking. 
The continent-wide  market. 
The existence  of an antitrust policy. 
Legal and institutional  changes-limited  liability, the stock market, and 
an investment  banking industry-were  needed  to assemble the capital to 
build factories on the scale needed  to serve a continental market. Without 
limited  liability, individual  investors  would  have been unwilling  to risk 
potentially  unlimited  losses  from the actions  of managers  they  did  not 
know  and could not control. Without the stock and bond markets, inves- 
tors would  have been less willing  to invest in large corporations because 
of the resulting  loss of liquidity.  Without investment  banking, investors' 
problem of sorting worthwhile  enterprises from others would  have been 
much more difficult. 
Moreover,  political  changes-the  rise  of  antitrust-were  needed  for 
two reasons. The first was  to try to make sure that the enormous  econo- 
mies of scale within  the grasp of the large corporation were not achieved 
at the price of replacing  competition  by monopoly.  The second  was  the 
political function of reassuring voters that the growing  large corporations 
would  be the economy's  servants rather than the voters' masters. 
Last, institutional  changes were needed  to make sure that the new cor- 
porations  could  serve  a continental  market. For example,  think of Swift 
Meatpacking.  Swift's  business  was  based  on  a very  good  idea:  mass- 
slaughter  the beef  in Chicago,  ship  it dressed  to Boston,  and undercut 
local  small-scale  Boston-area slaughterhouses  by  a third at the butcher 
shop.  This was  a very good  business  plan. It promised  to produce  large 
profits for entrepreneurs  and investors  and a much better diet at lower 
cost for consumers.  But what if the Massachusetts  legislature were to re- 
quire for reasons of health and safety that all meat sold in Massachusetts 
be inspected  live and on the hoof by a Massachusetts  meat inspector in 
Massachusetts  immediately  before slaughter? 
Without the right system  of governance-in  this case U.S. federal pre- 
emption  of  state health  and  safety  regulation  affecting  interstate  com- 
merce-you  wouldn't  have had America's Chicago meatpacking industry 
(or Upton  Sinclair's The  Jungle). That piece of late-nineteenth  century in- 
dustrialization  wouldn't  have  fallen into place. 
Because American institutions  changed  to support, nurture, and man- 
age the coming of mass production and the large-scale business enterprise 
chronicled  by  Alfred  Chandler-and  because  European  institutions  by 
and large did  not-it  was  America  that was  on the cutting  edge  at the Productivity  Growth  in the  2000s ? 143 
start of the twentieth century. It was America that was "the furnace where 
the future was  being  forged," as Leon Trotsky once said. 
What  changes  in  the  government-constructed  underpinnings  of  the 
market economy  are needed  for it to flourish  as the economic  changes 
produced by computers take hold? Optimistic views  of future macro pro- 
ductivity  growth  assume  that  government  will-somehow-get  these 
important micro questions  right. 
6. Conclusion 
The main argument of this paper has been that standard growth  models 
predict a bright future. Increased TFP in the IT capital-goods-producing 
sector, coupled  with extraordinary real capital deepening  as the quantity 
of real investment  in IT capital bought  by  a dollar  of nominal  savings 
grows, has driven the productivity  growth acceleration of the later 1990s, 
and promise  to drive equal or faster growth  in the next decade.  The ex- 
traordinary pace of invention  and innovation  in the IT sector has gener- 
ated real price declines  of between  10% and 20% per year in information 
processing  and communications  equipment  for nearly forty years so far. 
These extraordinary cost declines  have made a unit of real investment  in 
computer  or  communications  equipment  absurdly  cheap,  and  hence 
made  the quantity  of real investment  and thus  capital deepening  in IT 
capital absurdly  large. 
Continued declines in the prices of IT capital mean that a constant nom- 
inal flow of savings channeled to such investments  brings more and more 
real investment.  The social return to IT investment  would  have  to drop 
suddenly  to nearly zero, the share of nominal  investment  spending  de- 
voted  to IT capital would  have  to collapse,  or technological  progress  in 
IT would  have  to slow  drastically,  for labor productivity  growth  in the 
next decade  to reverse itself  and return to its late 1970s or 1980s levels. 
Yet there are no technological reasons for the pace of productivity increase 
in our economy's  leading  sectors to decline  over the next decade  or so. 
Moreover,  the future may  well  be brighter than the simplest  models 
suggest.  First, elasticity  of demand  for IT goods  is likely to remain high. 
A high elasticity of demand  for IT goods  means that as prices fall, expen- 
diture shares will not remain constant but will rise, boosting  growth. Sec- 
ond, the long-time  trend shows  the share of national income  attributable 
to  the  returns  on  the  existing  IT capital  stock  rising  as well.  This rise 
should  boost  growth  as well.  Third, Basu, Fernald, and  Shapiro  (2001) 
take  adjustment  costs  in  investment  seriously,  and  conclude  that late- 
1990s growth undershot  trend growth by about 0.5 percentage points per 
year. Fourth, David  (1991) has argued  for decades  that general-purpose 144 * DELONG 
technologies boost labor productivity in successive  stages, with the largest 
boost coming after the technology  has diffused  throughout  the economy. 
Is there any reason  to be pessimistic?  Only  a fear of large-scale  gov- 
ernmental failure in setting  forth the institutional  framework to support 
information-age  markets  could  lead  to  a pessimistic  forecast  of  future 
growth. 
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Economists  are not  particularly  good  at understanding  large,  one-time 
structural changes. We are not notably successful  at working in real time. 
And despite much effort, especially over the past 20 years, we still have no 
generally  accepted understanding  of the underlying  sources of technical 
change.  Any  single  paper that tries to tackle all three problems  at once 
is both incredibly  ambitious, and almost surely destined  to failure. Thus, 
it is not surprising that DeLong's paper does not succeed in explaining the 
enormously  important and extremely  puzzling  behavior  of productivity 
growth  in the United  State since  the mid-1990s-no  single  paper could 
be expected  to do so. But it illuminates  and elucidates most of the impor- 
tant issues  that need to be addressed  if we are to succeed  as a profession 
in explaining  this very important puzzle.  In keeping with the spirit of the 
paper, my comment  tries to put on the table one more fact that needs  to 
be explained  if we  are to have a tolerably complete  understanding  of the 
recent productivity  acceleration. 
Before doing so, however,  I want to shift the discussion  from labor pro- 
ductivity,  which  is  the  focus  of  DeLong's  paper,  to  technical  change 
(which, under standard conditions,  is equivalent to total factor productiv- 
ity). The reason is twofold.  First, a focus  on labor productivity  conflates 
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Comment 
SUSANTO  BASU 
University  of Michigan  and  NBER 
Economists  are not  particularly  good  at understanding  large,  one-time 
structural changes. We are not notably successful  at working in real time. 
And despite much effort, especially over the past 20 years, we still have no 
generally  accepted understanding  of the underlying  sources of technical 
change.  Any  single  paper that tries to tackle all three problems  at once 
is both incredibly  ambitious, and almost surely destined  to failure. Thus, 
it is not surprising that DeLong's paper does not succeed in explaining the 
enormously  important and extremely  puzzling  behavior  of productivity 
growth  in the United  State since  the mid-1990s-no  single  paper could 
be expected  to do so. But it illuminates  and elucidates most of the impor- 
tant issues  that need to be addressed  if we are to succeed  as a profession 
in explaining  this very important puzzle.  In keeping with the spirit of the 
paper, my comment  tries to put on the table one more fact that needs  to 
be explained  if we  are to have a tolerably complete  understanding  of the 
recent productivity  acceleration. 
Before doing so, however,  I want to shift the discussion  from labor pro- 
ductivity,  which  is  the  focus  of  DeLong's  paper,  to  technical  change 
(which, under standard conditions,  is equivalent to total factor productiv- 
ity). The reason is twofold.  First, a focus  on labor productivity  conflates 146  BASU 
impulses  and  propagation  mechanisms,  and  gives  the  somewhat  mis- 
leading  impression  that  we  understand  the  sources  of  productivity 
growth better than we actually do. DeLong's paper actually takes the rate 
of  technical  change  and  its  recent acceleration  as given,  and  combines 
these  with  various  standard models  of investment.  But the fact that we 
understand how falling capital-goods  prices can induce capital accumula- 
tion does not mean that we truly understand  the reasons for higher labor 
or total factor productivity  growth in the United States. Second, focusing 
on technical change helps  put an important fact into sharper focus.1 
To understand  the claims  I make below,  it's necessary  to do  a bit of 
growth accounting. Assume  that the economy  comprises just two sectors, 
one producing information technology  (IT)-here  identified with the pro- 
duction  of  computers,  semiconductors,  and  telecommunications  equip- 
ment-and  the other producing  everything  else  (called NT, for non-IT). 
Furthermore, assume  that production  in each sector can be represented 
using a production  function for gross output (Q), using capital (K), labor 
(L), intermediate  inputs  (M), technology  (T), and gross investment  (I): 
Qj =  F(Kj,  Lj, Mj, T, Ij),  j  =  IT, NT.  (1) 
The only variable that is not completely  standard is investment.  Its pres- 
ence is meant to capture the costs of adjusting the capital stock, here taken 
to be internal (output-reducing)  rather than external, as is often assumed. 
One should think of these "costs" in a very broad sense as including  com- 
plementary  (but otherwise  unmeasured)  investments.  Thus, rather than 
workers  and  machines  being  idled  as new  capital is installed,  perhaps 
machines  are idled  and workers  sent to be retrained on the new  equip- 
ment. Furthermore, the retraining-both  formal and on the job-can  last 
far longer and be much more costly than a quick office or factory shutdown.2 
Letting lowercase letters represent natural logs of their uppercase coun- 
terparts, letting starred variables be their steady-state values, and approx- 
imating  time  derivatives  by  finite differences,  equation  (1) implies  that 
the unobserved  technical change in each sector can be approximated  as3 
1. Sometimes  the use  of labor productivity  is justified  by claiming  that it gives  a way  to 
take account of unmeasured  output in the household  sector. But Basu and Femald (2001) 
argue that total factor productivity  is in fact a superior welfare measure as well: by sub- 
tracting the change  in labor input  from  output  growth,  the  TFP calculation  implicitly 
values  home  production  at its marginal opportunity  cost in forgone  market wages. 
2. In principle,  one  can  add  costs  of  adjusting  all the inputs,  especially  labor. However, 
empirically the costs of adjusting capital seem much larger, and the object of the exercise is 
to understand the late 1990s, which were characterized by extremely high rates of capital 
investment. 
3. See Basu, Femald,  and Shapiro (2001) for a derivation. Comment  ?  147 
At  =  Aqj -  ij(SF Akj +  si  Alj +  si  Amj)  -  Aij,  (2) 
where  the sj terms are the shares  of input  costs  in the total revenue  of 
sector j, and gj is the ratio of price to marginal cost in that sector. 
From the discussion  above, we expect that F5 <  0. Hence, the last term 
in equation  (2) is actually positive  as long as investment  is growing.  The 
intuition is that the process of installing capital is in fact an output of the 
firm, although it is not recorded as such because it is not a market good. If 
the firm installs capital instead of producing market output then measured 
output falls, but total output does not fall as much and may actually rise. 
The last term in equation  (2) adds back this unmeasured  output  growth, 
which  means that in times of high investment  growth technology  is actu- 
ally rising faster than the usual  calculation would  lead us to believe.4 
One can aggregate technical change in the two sectors to get a measure 
of overall technology  growth  using  Domar (1961) aggregation,  extended 
to allow  for imperfect competition: 
PjYj  At1 
At  =  A' 
; 
(3) 
Irrt  ,NT  Y  +  PNTYNT  1  - 
gjSj 
where  PjYj  is the total revenue  in sector j. 
Basu, Femald,  and Shapiro (2001) implement  this framework, with ad- 
ditional controls for variable factor utilization.  Using  their industry-level 
results (not reported in their paper), one can compute  time series of tech- 
nical change for the aggregate and the contributions of IT and NT to that 
aggregate change. Following  the recent convention  (e.g., Stiroh, forthcom- 
ing), I take the IT-producing industries to be SIC 35 and 36. Table 1 shows 
the means  of these  series for various  sample  periods. 
Lines 2 and 3 show  the results  for the first and  second  halves  of the 
1990s. In both subperiods IT has an importance disproportionate  to its size 
(about 5.5% of the economy).  However,  since the IT-producing sectors are 
such a small share of the economy,  most of the growth in technical change 
for the economy  as a whole  is driven by technical change  in the non-IT- 
producing  sectors. Subtracting line 2 from line 3 gives  the results for the 
late 1990s acceleration  on line 4. The surprising  result is that of the 1.9- 
percentage-point  acceleration  in  technical  change,  only  0.3 percentage 
points came from IT. The acceleration of technical change in the economy 
4. This idea  is similar  to  the  "1974" hypothesis  of Yorukoglu  and  Greenwood  (1997). In 
terms of implementation,  the main difference is their suggestion  that the costs of adjust- 
ment  may  last for many  years,  so one  should  have  a number  of lags  of investment  as 
well  as current investment  in equations  (1) and (2). 148 *  BASU 
Table 1  TECHNICAL  CHANGE  BY  INDUSTRY  GROUP  AND SUBPERIOD 
At 
Subperiod  Total  From  IT  From  NT 
1987-1999  2.0  0.5  1.5 
1990-1995  1.2  0.3  0.9 
1995-1999  3.1  0.7  2.4 
Late 1990s  acceleration  1.9  0.3  1.6 
in the second  half of the 1990s was  due  to something  other than faster 
technical change in the sectors producing computers and telecommunica- 
tions equipment. 
This result, seemingly intuitive, is actually quite difficult to reconcile with 
the usual formalization of production.  DeLong cites Stiroh (forthcoming) 
as saying  that some of the labor productivity  gains in the economy  come 
from IT-using sectors. But the same should not be true of total factor produc- 
tivity. According  to the usual model  of production-e.g.,  the production 
function for NT in equation (1)-more  or better inputs are movements along 
the production function, not shifts of the production function. As the usual 
dictum has it, "cheaper inputs don't shift production functions." 
There are at least four stories that might explain this observation. Two 
attribute it to mismeasurement,  and two  to actual technical change. The 
first mismeasurement  story is that IT capital quality is growing faster than 
measured  in the statistics, so there is effectively  more IT investment  than 
is actually measured, with the unmeasured  investment  wrongly  showing 
up as faster technical change. This story seems unlikely, because a number 
of papers by Erik Brynjolfsson and his coauthors (e.g., Brynjolfsson, Hitt, 
and Yang, 2000) show  that the increased  investment  raises productivity 
five or more years after the investment  is made, not immediately  as one 
would  expect with straightforward mismeasurement.  The second story is 
actually the preferred explanation  of Brynjolfsson, Hitt, and Yang (2000) 
for their results.  They  attribute the increases  in productivity  and  stock 
market valuation  after IT investment  to unmeasured  complementary  in- 
vestments-for  example, training, learning-by-doing, and general research 
on using  IT effectively.  Here the question  is whether  these  unmeasured 
investments  are nonrival. If they are, at least in part-and  many of them 
sound  like some  form of knowledge-then  they  do constitute  technical 
change in the sense that other firms can boost production without incurring 
similar resource costs. Of course innovations may take some time to spread 
to other firms-this  temporary competitive advantage is presumably why 
the private investment is worthwhile-but  slow diffusion of technology  is Comment  ? 149 
actually a reason to be hopeful, for it indicates that many of the social returns 
to these complementary  investments  may lie ahead. 
The two  interpretations  of the Table 1 results as denoting  actual tech- 
nological  change  are  quite  similar  to  the  nonrival  complementary  in- 
vestment  story.  The  first  takes  seriously  the  idea  of  computers  and 
telecommunications  as  a  new  general-purpose  technology  (GPT) (see 
Helpman  and Trajtenberg, 1998). As these models  assume  and economic 
history shows  clearly, a GPT needs  to be combined  with various specific 
innovations  in order to yield  large production  efficiencies. These innova- 
tions  often  require substantial  time, and secondary  innovations  of their 
own,  to change the structure of production.  The second  interpretation- 
really  a  special  case  of  the  GPT story-is  that  there  is  capital-biased 
(Solow-neutral)  technical change. In principle the derivative  of equation 
(1) with  respect to T may depend  on all the other variables, including  K. 
Jorgenson  (1988) has used  the idea of energy-biased  technical change  to 
explain  the productivity  slowdown  that started in the late 1960s or early 
1970s. One problem with this story has always been the absence of a major 
speedup  in productivity  growth following  the collapse of oil prices in the 
mid-1980s.  A  simpler,  unified  explanation  is the hypothesis  of directed 
technical change: the idea that innovation  is directed towards  economiz- 
ing  on expensive  inputs  while  being  profligate  with  cheap  ones.  In the 
1950s and 1960s the cheap input was oil; in the 1990s it was IT hardware. 
But in any given  subperiod,  directed technological  change may be indis- 
tinguishable  from factor-biased technical progress. It is in this sense  that 
the second  explanation  is a special  case of the first. 
Thus, my  intuition  is that the key  to understanding  the productivity 
acceleration of the 1990s is making progress  on modeling  the process  of 
directed  technological  change  in the presence  of a new  GPT and, espe- 
cially, confronting the models with detailed industry- and firm-level data. 
There are now some excellent overviews  on how one might go about these 
difficult tasks-see,  especially,  Bresnahan (2001). But it is fair to say that 
these appealing  stories have not had many empirical successes.  If the sto- 
ries are right, then technical change in the non-IT sectors have been driven 
by  technical  progress  in IT, which  has  led  to ever-falling  prices  for IT 
equipment.  I tried to estimate  the  reduced-form  model,  correlating  the 
industry  residuals  in the non-IT sector on lagged  technical change  in IT 
using  the industry-level  data used  to construct Table 1. I found  no evi- 
dence  of a strong or stable relationship  between  the two.  One can come 
up  with  many  reasons  why  this relatively  aggregative  approach  might 
not be successful.  But the failure is disappointing  nonetheless,  because it 
means  that there is little direct evidence  for some  of the most  appealing 
economic  models  that might explain the major acceleration in productiv- 150  JOVANOVIC 
ity in the mid-1990s. Despite DeLong's nice paper, this area still abounds 
with  questions  awaiting  answers. 
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New York  University 
1. Introduction 
Bradford DeLong  offers us  an entertaining,  well-written,  and balanced 
introduction  to the "new economy."  We all hope,  of course,  that in the 
next decade  or two  we  will  see the economy  return to the high  growth 
rates that it experienced  in the late 1990s. As consumers and workers, we 
hope  that the productivity  slowdown  of the 1970s was  a symptom  of an 
investment  episode  that will  pay  off  in the near future  in the  form of 
cheaper new  products  and higher  wages  for our labor services.  And  as 
a growth  theorist, I root for the new  economy  because  Schumpeter-style 
creative destruction is, to me, much more exciting to think about than an 
economy  in a steady  forward creep. 
Brad's assessment  is balanced: On the one hand, the productivity  slow- 
down  of the 1970s is still unexplained,  and it is not at all clear that the 
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hope  that the productivity  slowdown  of the 1970s was  a symptom  of an 
investment  episode  that will  pay  off  in the near future  in the  form of 
cheaper new  products  and higher  wages  for our labor services.  And  as 
a growth  theorist, I root for the new  economy  because  Schumpeter-style 
creative destruction is, to me, much more exciting to think about than an 
economy  in a steady  forward creep. 
Brad's assessment  is balanced: On the one hand, the productivity  slow- 
down  of the 1970s is still unexplained,  and it is not at all clear that the Comment 151 
slowdown  represented  a conscious  sacrifice of  output  in return for ex- 
pected future growth. On the other hand, Brad says that the rapid produc- 
tivity growth of the late 1990s will probably persist for some time because 
1. producers  will  rely even  more  on IT capital than they  do  at present 
(Section 4), and 
2.  Moore's  Law will  probably  continue  to hold  for a decade  or longer 
(Sections 2 and 4). 
I agree with  almost  everything  that Brad says  in this paper, and I shall 
merely  expand  on these two  specific points. 
2. The  Growing  Share  of IT Capital 
As Brad observes  in Section 5 of his paper, the GPTs of the past should 
provide us with a clue about what will happen in the coming decades. Let 
us take a look at the electrification of the United States after 1890. Warren 
Devine  (1983) shows  that electricity made  its impact on industry  in two 
waves.  The first wave  did not use electricity to its fullest extent. It simply 
used electricity to drive the main shaft to which  machinery was  attached 
by belts. Only after 1910, when individual  drive was introduced with each 
machine itself plugged into an electric socket, were the full benefits achieved. 
Figure 1 plots  the isoquants  of two technologies.  The first technology, 
shafts, was  intensive  in nonelectrical  equipment;  it relied  on  electricity 
only  to power  the main drive  to which  old machinery  was  attached ex- 
actly as it had been when the main drive was powered  by a steam engine. 
As a source of energy per se, electricity was  cheaper than steam, but the 
shafts technology  attained only a fraction of the cost savings  that electrifi- 
cation  had  to  offer. To get  the  full  potential,  one  had  to  use  electrical 
equipment plugged  into sockets. This wires technology  allowed more free- 
dom in the type of building  used and in the layout of the equipment,  and 
it avoided  the noise,  dirt, and clutter of a factory where  the conduits  of 
power  were belts linking the machinery  to the heavily  greased  shafts. 
Assume  that each technology  is Leontieff and yields  constant returns 
to scale. Initially electrical equipment  is expensive.  Let the initial isocost 
line  be  Pi-Pl.  We  choose  the  initial  date  so  that shafts  and  wires  are 
equally affordable, and points A and A* both yield a level of output equal 
to Y. Since returns are constant, this indifference must hold at any budget 
line parallel to Pi-P1. 
Over time,  the budget  line twists  anticlockwise  to, e.g., P1-P2. There, 
more output  can be produced  at point C with wires  than at point B with 
shafts  (i.e.,  Y3 <  Y2). Figure 2 leaves  out  the  switching  costs  that held 152 *  JOVANOVIC 
Figure 1 THE SWITCH FROM SHAFTS TO WIRES 
Other Capital 
Electrical Equipment 
firms from using wires until the 1910-1930 period. As old and new facto- 
ries were wired,  productivity  rose sharply. 
Now  fast-forward to the early 1970s when the U.S. economy began con- 
verting  from  the  mainframe  to  the  microcomputer.  For "shafts" read 
"mainframe" and for "wires" read "PC," and the same story applies. The 
productivity  growth  of the late 1990s is, by most  accounts,  the result of 
this switch. 
What does this say about today? Businesses shifted from shafts to wires 
between  1910 and 1930. They shifted from mainframes to personal com- 
puters after 1970. Each wave was followed  by an episode  of high produc- 
tivity growth, and we hope that we are-or  that we shall soon again be- 
in the middle  of one such growth  episode. 
3. Computers  vs. Electricity  and Internal 
Combustion  Engines 
Moore's  law  translates into  a rapid rate of price  decline  for computers 
and  related  equipment.  Let us  compare  the price  index  for computers Comment  153 
Figure 2 PRICES AND  CUMULATIVE QUANTITIES OF NEW-ECONOMY 
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with those of electricity and the internal combustion engine at a compara- 
ble stage in their development. 
Gordon  Moore stated his  law  in terms of time, but  this does  not  tell 
us why  computer prices fell. One hypothesis  is that computer producers 
become more efficient as they sell more and more computers. Other GPTs 
also  improved  as they were  applied.  Management  scientists  often mea- 
sure the application  of a technology  by  the cumulative  sales  of its out- 
put. Let us therefore restate Moore's law  in terms of cumulative-output 
growth  instead  of in terms of the passage  of time. 
Let p denote the price of a product. As the cost of producing  it declines, 
so does its price, and all this is caused by the rise in the cumulative  output, 
K, of all producers  combined: 
/KA 
p  (  *  (1) 
where  B is a constant. In logarithmic form, (1) reads 
In p,  =  0o  -  P In Kt-,  (2) 
where Po  -  P In B. Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) estimate this equation 
for three GPTs: computers,  electricity,  and the  internal combustion  en- 
gine. Figure 2 presents  pairwise  combinations  of In pt and In Kt-I on an 
annual basis for each technology  and plots a regression line through the 
points.  The regression  estimates  are reported in Figure 2 itself. 
The computer,  displayed  in panel  (a), shows  much the fastest decline 
in p, and the effect seems to be accelerating.1 Panels (b) and (c)-electricity 
and cars-show  a lower decline and no acceleration. Even if Moore's law 
were  to  slow  to  a quarter of  its current pace,  it still would  dwarf  the 
typical price decline in the other two GPTs. In fact, experts such as Meindl, 
Chen, and Davis  (2001) tell us that Moore's law  will  hold  at its current 
pace for at least another 20 years. 
4. Conclusion 
Moore's law is unique: Capital goods  have never declined  in price as fast 
as they  are declining  at present.  On these  grounds  alone,  productivity 
growth  should  for a while  be well  above  its twentieth-century  average. 
Moreover,  the use  of IT involves  a network  exterality  in a way  that 
1. A  description  of how  the  price  series  were  constructed  is in Jovanovic  and  Rousseau 
(2002)-note  3 in the published  version  or note 2 in the NBER version. Discussion 155 
neither  electricity  nor internal  combustion  did.  This is  apparent  in the 
rising value  of the Internet as more  and more businesses  get  online.  In 
spite  of their low  cost, computers  and information  systems  have  spread 
in full  force only  in a few  rich countries.  As  people  elsewhere  join the 
network,  they too will enjoy some of the gains that we saw in the United 
States in the 1990s, and the network effect will then lead to higher growth 
globally. 
REFERENCES 
Devine, W., Jr.  (1983).  From  shafts to wires: Historical  perspective  on electrifica- 
tion. Journal  of Economic  History  43(2):347-372. 
Jovanovic,  B., and P. L. Rousseau. (2002).  Moore's law and learning by doing. 
Review  of Economic  Dynamics  5(2, April):346-375.  NBER  Working  Paper 8762. 
Cambridge,  MA: National Bureau  of Economic  Research. 
Meindl, J. D., Q. Chen, and J. A. Davis. (2001).  Limits  on silicon nanoelectronics 
for terascale  integration.  Science  293:2044-2049. 
Discussion 
Bob Gordon emphasized  that even if Moore's law continues  to hold, it is 
not certain what will happen to real computer investment, as this depends 
on the elasticity of demand for computing power. Gordon speculated that 
the key  question  is what  "killer applications"  on the demand  side  will 
be  able to soak  up  the increase  in computing  power  made  possible  by 
Moore's law and the fall in computer prices. He commented  that the ques- 
tion of the extent to which productivity  growth is driven by the old econ- 
omy vs. the new economy  is an interesting one, and remarked that several 
old-economy  sectors such as landscaping  are expanding  in importance. 
Brad DeLong  remarked that the interaction  of public  policy,  intellec- 
tual-property  rights, and the development  of new  applications  for com- 
puting  power  is a very interesting theme. He expressed  surprise that the 
pricing and limitation  of access to intellectual  property is proceeding  so 
slowly,  especially considering  the fact that some firms such as AOL-Time 
Warner are at one  and the same  time facilitating  access  and fighting  to 
restrict access. However,  Bob Hall disagreed  with what he referred to as 
DeLong's pessimism  on how the economy handles Schumpeterian goods. 
He remarked that while pessimism  might be justified in theory, in practice 
the market for software functions quite successfully  without  government 
intervention. 
Bob Hall  commented  further that, contrary to the assumption  of the 
literature, there are two general-purpose  technologies  present rather than 
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neither  electricity  nor internal  combustion  did.  This is  apparent  in the 
rising value  of the Internet as more  and more businesses  get  online.  In 
spite  of their low  cost, computers  and information  systems  have  spread 
in full  force only  in a few  rich countries.  As  people  elsewhere  join the 
network,  they too will enjoy some of the gains that we saw in the United 
States in the 1990s, and the network effect will then lead to higher growth 
globally. 
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Discussion 
Bob Gordon emphasized  that even if Moore's law continues  to hold, it is 
not certain what will happen to real computer investment, as this depends 
on the elasticity of demand for computing power. Gordon speculated that 
the key  question  is what  "killer applications"  on the demand  side  will 
be  able to soak  up  the increase  in computing  power  made  possible  by 
Moore's law and the fall in computer prices. He commented  that the ques- 
tion of the extent to which productivity  growth is driven by the old econ- 
omy vs. the new economy  is an interesting one, and remarked that several 
old-economy  sectors such as landscaping  are expanding  in importance. 
Brad DeLong  remarked that the interaction  of public  policy,  intellec- 
tual-property  rights, and the development  of new  applications  for com- 
puting  power  is a very interesting theme. He expressed  surprise that the 
pricing and limitation  of access to intellectual  property is proceeding  so 
slowly,  especially considering  the fact that some firms such as AOL-Time 
Warner are at one  and the same  time facilitating  access  and fighting  to 
restrict access. However,  Bob Hall disagreed  with what he referred to as 
DeLong's pessimism  on how the economy handles Schumpeterian goods. 
He remarked that while pessimism  might be justified in theory, in practice 
the market for software functions quite successfully  without  government 
intervention. 
Bob Hall  commented  further that, contrary to the assumption  of the 
literature, there are two general-purpose  technologies  present rather than 156 * DISCUSSION 
just  one.  He  differentiated  between  the  computer  and  the  database  as 
two distinct general-purpose  technologies.  He remarked that the success 
of  companies  such  as WalMart, Dell,  Southwest,  and  Ebay is built  on 
the ability to keep track of huge amounts of data rather than on the com- 
puter as such. On Gordon's point with respect to new-economy-  vs. old- 
economy-driven  productivity  growth,  he  was  of the  opinion  that most 
sectors have not yet even begun  to harness the power  of modern  IT. As 
an example,  he compared  WalMart with  Kmart. 
DeLong  drew  Hall's  attention  to the  finding  in  the recent McKinsey 
U.S. productivity  study  that a large share of productivity  growth  at the 
micro level  is due  not to IT, but to competitive  pressure  from WalMart 
on the retail sector. He  asked  Hall how  it is possible  that this competi- 
tive pressure  is not related to WalMart's use  of IT. Hall responded  that 
WalMart's success  arises not just from its use of IT in the realm of logis- 
tics,  but  also  from  its  success  in  human-resource  management.  Bob 
Gordon  added  that  the  advantage  of  Southwest  Airlines  over  compa- 
nies such as United lies in its employee  relations rather than in its use of 
technology. 
Mark Gertler asked  DeLong  to speculate  further on the source  of the 
productivity  slowdown  of the 1970s. He suggested  a connection between 
low-frequency  movements  in  unemployment  and  labor  productiv- 
ity as a starting point.  DeLong  replied  that he  saw  the causality  going 
from labor productivity  to unemployment.  He  found  plausible  a story 
that  linked  low  productivity  growth  to  high  unemployment  through 
workers'  expectations  of wage  growth  that failed  to keep  in step  with 
productivity. 
Justin Wolfers invited  Brad DeLong  to speculate  on  the impact  of IT 
on the progress of economic science. DeLong and Gordon both responded 
by  referring  to  Griliches's  comment  that  cheap  computers  meant  too 
many regressions  and too little thought  put into specification.  However, 
Bob Gordon remarked that the work of Stock and Watson would  not be 
possible without the advances in computing  power that have taken place. 
Summing up, Brad DeLong agreed with Susanto Basu's discussion  that 
it is embarrassing not to be able to say much about multifactor productiv- 
ity growth. However,  he commented  that the danger in focusing  on TFP 
growth  is that capital deepening  might be ignored. Looking forward, he 
speculated  that a substantial  amount  of labor productivity  growth  will 
come about through capital deepening  as a result of Moore's law and the 
falling  price  of  IT. He  also  suggested  that capital  deepening  might  be 
responsible for the recent phenomenon  of falling labor inputs at the same 
time as very little fall in real GDP. On the question of TFP growth outside Discussion 157 
the IT sector, he suggested  that the computer  is not merely  a case of an 
input whose  price is falling, but of an entirely new  kind of input  of the 
kind  referred to by  stories  of the  general-purpose-technology  type.  He 
agreed with both discussants  that it makes sense to try to model multifac- 
tor productivity  as generated  by some  form of human  action. However, 
he noted  that the importance  of multifactor productivity  suggests  that if 
it were  generated by some particular activity, economists  would  already 
have  an idea of what  that activity is, and how  to encourage  it. 